Authentication answers:
Who or what are you?
Authorization answers the next and equally important question:
Now that I know who you are, what are you allowed to do?
A perfectly authenticated user should still be denied access when the requested action exceeds legitimate authority.
For example:
an HR analyst may view employee records but should not administer firewalls;
a database administrator may maintain a database but should not automatically approve financial transactions;
a physician may access assigned patient records but not every record in a national health system;
an application service may query one database table but should not automatically receive administrator privileges.
Authorization therefore determines the relationship among:
SUBJECT
+
RESOURCE
+
REQUESTED ACTION
+
POLICY
+
CONTEXT
=
ALLOW / DENY
The current CISSP Examination Outline places this lesson primarily under Domain 5, Objective 5.4 β Implement and manage authorization mechanisms.
ISC2 currently identifies:
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC);
rule-based access control;
Mandatory Access Control (MAC);
Discretionary Access Control (DAC);
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC);
risk-based access control;
access-policy enforcement, including Policy Decision Points and Policy Enforcement Points.
NIST defines ABAC as an authorization methodology in which attributes associated with subjects, objects, requested operations, and sometimes environmental conditions are evaluated against policy.
NIST Zero Trust Architecture similarly separates the component that makes an access decision from the mechanism that enforces that decision.
The central Lesson Nineteen question is:
Once an identity has been authenticated, how should an organization determine exactly what that subject may access, under what conditions, and how should that authorization decision be enforced?
| Lesson Topic | Primary Alignment |
|---|---|
| Authorization fundamentals | Domain 5.4 |
| Subjects and objects | 5.4 foundation |
| Rights, permissions, privileges | 5.4 foundation |
| Entitlements | 5.4 foundation |
| Access-control matrix | 5.4 supporting concept |
| ACLs | 5.4 supporting concept |
| Capability concepts | 5.4 supporting concept |
| RBAC | 5.4 |
| Role hierarchy | RBAC supporting concept |
| Separation-of-duty constraints | RBAC supporting concept |
| Rule-based access control | 5.4 |
| MAC | 5.4 |
| Security labels | MAC supporting concept |
| Clearance | MAC supporting concept |
| DAC | 5.4 |
| Resource ownership | DAC supporting concept |
| ABAC | 5.4 |
| Subject attributes | ABAC |
| Object attributes | ABAC |
| Environmental attributes | ABAC |
| Risk-based access control | 5.4 |
| Context-aware authorization | 5.4 |
| Policy Decision Point | 5.4 |
| Policy Enforcement Point | 5.4 |
| Policy Information Point | Supporting policy architecture |
| Policy Administration Point | Supporting policy architecture |
| Zero Trust authorization | 5.4 supporting architecture |
| Least privilege | Domains 1, 5 |
| Need to know | Domains 1, 5 |
| Separation of duties | Domains 1, 5 |
| Explicit/implicit deny concepts | 5.4 |
| Authorization logging | 5.4 / Domain 7 bridge |
After completing this lesson, you should be able to:
Define authorization.
Distinguish authentication from authorization.
Define subject and object.
Define permission.
Define right.
Define privilege.
Define entitlement.
Explain an access-control matrix.
Explain an Access Control List.
Explain capability-based authorization conceptually.
Explain default-deny authorization.
Explain explicit and implicit denial.
Explain least privilege.
Explain need to know.
Explain separation of duties.
Define RBAC.
Explain role assignment.
Explain permission assignment.
Explain role hierarchy.
Explain constrained RBAC.
Explain static separation of duties.
Explain dynamic separation of duties.
Explain role explosion.
Explain rule-based access control.
Distinguish rule-based access control from RBAC.
Define MAC.
Explain security labels.
Explain classification.
Explain clearance.
Explain categories/compartments.
Explain why MAC is centrally administered.
Define DAC.
Explain object ownership.
Explain why DAC is discretionary.
Compare MAC and DAC.
Define ABAC.
Explain subject attributes.
Explain object attributes.
Explain action attributes.
Explain environmental attributes.
Develop a basic ABAC policy.
Explain ABAC benefits.
Explain ABAC complexity.
Define risk-based access control.
Explain adaptive authorization.
Explain contextual access.
Explain continuous reevaluation.
Define Policy Decision Point.
Define Policy Enforcement Point.
Define Policy Information Point.
Define Policy Administration Point.
Explain decision versus enforcement.
Explain Zero Trust authorization.
Explain session-level authorization.
Explain step-up authentication.
Explain authorization revocation.
Explain access-policy lifecycle management.
Apply FIRST/BEST/MOST CISSP reasoning to authorization questions.
Compare all major authorization mechanisms.
Analyze original CISSP-style authorization scenarios.
Authentication establishes confidence in the claimed identity.
Question:
Can you prove who you claim to be?
Authorization determines whether the authenticated subject may perform the requested action on the resource.
Question:
Are you permitted to do this?
USER
β
βΌ
AUTHENTICATED
β
βΌ
REQUEST:
"READ PAYROLL"
β
βΌ
AUTHORIZED?
ββββ΄βββ
YES NO
β β
ALLOW DENY
A legitimate employee can still be denied access.
Authentication establishes identity. Authorization establishes permitted activity.
Never confuse them.
A subject is an active entity requesting access.
Examples:
employee;
process;
application;
service;
device.
An object is the protected resource.
Examples:
file;
record;
database;
API;
server;
printer;
application function.
The requested operation may include:
read;
write;
execute;
modify;
delete;
approve;
administer.
SUBJECT
Alice
β
βΌ
ACTION
Modify
β
βΌ
OBJECT
Payroll Record
The authorization system evaluates whether:
Alice may modify that payroll record.
A permission describes an allowed operation on a resource.
Example:
Read Report A.
The terms right and permission are often used similarly.
At CISSP level:
Focus on the authorized action rather than terminology differences between products.
A privilege generally represents an authorized capability, often with elevated or system-level significance.
Examples:
create accounts;
load drivers;
modify security configuration.
An entitlement represents access granted to an identity.
It may include:
application access;
role membership;
privilege;
group membership.
An access-control matrix represents:
subjects as one dimension;
objects as another;
permitted actions at their intersections.
| Subject | Payroll DB | HR Files | Firewall |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alice | Read | Read/Write | None |
| Bob | None | Read | None |
| Carol | None | None | Admin |
It provides a conceptual model for answering:
Who can do what to which object?
An Access Control List is commonly associated with an object and identifies subjects or groups and their permitted or denied access.
Example:
PAYROLL.DOC
β
βββ Finance Group β Read
βββ Payroll Admin β Read/Write
βββ Guest β Deny
Think:
For this object, who can access it?
A capability-oriented representation emphasizes:
Which objects/actions can this subject access?
Example:
ALICE
β
βββ Payroll β Read
βββ Expenses β Approve
βββ HR Portal β Login
Conceptually:
ACL
Object-centric view
CAPABILITY
Subject-centric view
ACCESS MATRIX
Complete conceptual relationship
A strong security model generally begins with:
Access is denied unless appropriately authorized.
If the policy cannot establish that access is permitted:
the safer result is normally denial.
When faced with:
uncertain authorization;
missing approval;
unexplained entitlement;
CISSP reasoning generally favors:
restricting access until legitimate authorization is established.
An explicit rule may specifically state:
Finance interns cannot approve transactions.
If no authorization exists for an action, the system may deny it by default.
Actual policy precedence differs across technologies.
Do not memorize one universal ACL evaluation algorithm.
The broader principle is:
Do not grant access merely because a policy failed to address it.
Grant only the privileges necessary to perform legitimate duties.
BUSINESS NEED
β
βΌ
REQUIRED TASK
β
βΌ
MINIMUM PRIVILEGE
A backup operator needs:
run backup;
verify backup.
The operator may not require:
HR-record access;
firewall administration;
domain administration.
Need to know limits information access to subjects with legitimate operational need.
LEAST PRIVILEGE
"What actions do you need?"
NEED TO KNOW
"What information do you need?"
Separation of Duties divides sensitive responsibilities among different people or roles.
Example:
USER A
Creates vendor
USER B
Approves vendor
USER C
Approves payment
Prevent one individual from controlling an entire high-risk transaction.
Role-Based Access Control assigns permissions according to organizational roles rather than individually managing every user-to-resource relationship.
NIST describes RBAC as mediating access through roles associated with organizational functions.
USER
β
βΌ
ROLE
β
βΌ
PERMISSIONS
β
βΌ
RESOURCES
Alice
β
βΌ
PAYROLL CLERK
β
βββ View Employee Pay
βββ Enter Payroll Data
βββ Generate Payroll Report
Organizations commonly think in terms of jobs such as:
accountant;
nurse;
administrator;
auditor.
Roles map naturally to these responsibilities.
Without RBAC:
1,000 USERS
Γ
200 APPLICATIONS
=
LARGE PERMISSION COMPLEXITY
With RBAC:
USERS
β
ROLES
β
PERMISSIONS
NIST describes a core RBAC idea as associating permissions with roles and assigning users to appropriate roles rather than administering every permission directly per user.
ALICE β ACCOUNTANT
BOB β SECURITY ANALYST
CAROL β DATABASE ADMIN
Users receive permissions through their assigned role or roles.
DATABASE ADMIN
β
βββ Create Database
βββ Backup Database
βββ Restore Database
Permissions attach to the role.
Roles can inherit permissions from other roles.
Example:
SENIOR ACCOUNTANT
β
βΌ
ACCOUNTANT
β
βΌ
BASE FINANCE USER
Common permissions need not be repeatedly assigned.
Poorly designed role inheritance can create:
unintended privilege accumulation.
RBAC systems can impose restrictions such as:
mutually exclusive roles;
separation of duties;
role activation limits.
NIST's RBAC work recognizes hierarchical and constrained RBAC as important extensions to core role assignment.
A user cannot be assigned two conflicting roles simultaneously.
Example:
PAYMENT CREATOR
X
PAYMENT APPROVER
Prevent the conflict before access is assigned.
A user may be eligible for multiple roles but cannot activate conflicting roles during the same sensitive transaction or session.
An employee may perform:
purchasing duties at one time;
approval duties in another context;
but may not:
initiate and approve the same transaction.
Organizations sometimes create increasingly specific roles:
FINANCE-READ
FINANCE-READ-LONDON
FINANCE-READ-LONDON-MANAGER
FINANCE-READ-LONDON-MANAGER-Q4
...
This creates:
RBAC can become:
difficult to administer;
difficult to review;
difficult to understand.
This is one reason organizations may combine RBAC with attributes.
Rule-based access control makes decisions using predefined system rules.
Example:
IF
source_network = corporate
AND
time = 08:00β18:00
THEN
permit access
Rules can relate to:
network address;
time;
transaction type;
system condition;
protocol.
Access based primarily on organizational role.
Access based on defined rules or conditions.
RBAC:
Payroll Manager may approve payroll.
Rule-based:
Payroll approvals are allowed only during the authorized processing window.
ROLE:
Payroll Manager
+
RULE:
Weekday + approved device
=
ACCESS
Mandatory Access Control uses centrally administered security policy to determine access.
Subjects and objects may have:
clearances;
classifications;
labels;
compartments.
The ordinary user does not decide:
βI own this file, so I will give everyone access.β
The system's mandatory policy controls access.
An object may have a label such as:
SECRET
or:
SECRET // PROJECT ALPHA
A subject may hold:
SECRET CLEARANCE
However:
Clearance alone may not be enough.
The subject may also require:
need to know;
appropriate compartment/category authorization.
Typically describes sensitivity assigned to information.
Represents the level at which the subject has been authorized.
SUBJECT
Clearance + Categories
β
βΌ
MANDATORY POLICY
β
βΌ
OBJECT
Classification + Categories
Alice has:
SECRET clearance.
Document:
TOP SECRET.
Alice cannot simply decide:
βI need it.β
The centralized mandatory security policy controls access.
MAC provides strong centralized control suitable where information classifications and formal policy boundaries are important.
MAC can be:
administratively rigid;
less flexible for informal collaboration.
Discretionary Access Control allows an owner or authorized controller of an object to determine who receives access, subject to system policy.
Alice creates:
ProjectPlan.docx
Alice may be permitted to grant Bob:
Read access.
The owner has meaningful control over the access decision.
OBJECT OWNER
β
βββ Alice β Read
βββ Bob β Modify
βββ Guest β No Access
DAC works well for:
collaborative systems;
user-owned files;
general business computing.
A user may:
grant too much access;
misunderstand sensitivity;
share information incorrectly.
Historically, DAC models also raise concern because access rights can potentially be propagated or exploited by software acting with a user's authority.
At CISSP level:
Understand that DAC provides flexibility at the cost of greater reliance on owner discretion.
| MAC | DAC |
|---|---|
| Centrally controlled | Owner-controlled |
| Label/policy driven | Discretionary sharing |
| User cannot freely override | Owner may grant access |
| Strong centralized enforcement | Greater flexibility |
| Common in high-assurance classified environments | Common in general-purpose systems |
Attribute-Based Access Control evaluates characteristics associated with:
subject;
object;
requested operation;
environment;
against policy.
This matches NIST's formal ABAC definition.
SUBJECT ATTRIBUTES
+
OBJECT ATTRIBUTES
+
ACTION
+
ENVIRONMENT
+
POLICY
=
ALLOW / DENY
Subject attributes might include:
department;
employment status;
job level;
clearance;
location;
device ownership;
training status.
Object attributes may include:
classification;
owner;
data type;
business unit;
geographic restriction.
Examples:
read;
modify;
approve;
delete;
print;
export.
Different actions can have different policies.
Examples:
time;
location;
device posture;
threat level;
network;
transaction risk.
Policy:
Permit physician to view a patient record if the physician is currently assigned to the patient and accesses from an approved managed device.
SUBJECT.role = Physician
+
SUBJECT.assignment = Patient123
+
OBJECT.patient = Patient123
+
DEVICE.managed = True
=
ALLOW
RBAC asks:
What role does Alice have?
ABAC can ask:
What role does Alice have, which patient is assigned to her, what device is she using, where is she, and what action is requested?
NIST describes ABAC as useful for improving information sharing while retaining control because authorization can reflect multiple attributes and policy relationships.
ABAC depends on trustworthy:
attributes;
policies;
data sources;
policy processing.
Incorrect attributes can produce incorrect authorization.
If HR incorrectly lists:
Alice.department = Finance
then an ABAC policy relying on that attribute may grant inappropriate finance access.
Authorization quality cannot exceed attribute quality.
Attributes should have:
trusted sources;
defined ownership;
lifecycle management.
Risk-based authorization considers current risk indicators when making access decisions.
Example signals:
new device;
unusual location;
abnormal behavior;
high-risk transaction;
threat intelligence.
KNOWN USER
+
MANAGED DEVICE
+
NORMAL LOCATION
+
LOW-RISK ACTION
=
ALLOW
KNOWN USER
+
UNKNOWN DEVICE
+
UNUSUAL LOCATION
+
HIGH-VALUE TRANSFER
=
STEP-UP / RESTRICT / DENY
Authorization does not always have to remain static for the entire session.
Risk may change.
At 9:00:
User accesses normal reports.
At 9:30:
User begins downloading thousands of sensitive records.
System may:
restrict;
reauthenticate;
revoke session.
AUTHENTICATE
β
βΌ
AUTHORIZE
β
βΌ
MONITOR
β
βΌ
CONTEXT CHANGES?
ββββ΄ββββ
NO YES
β β
KEEP REEVALUATE
Authorization architecture needs to answer:
Who decides?
Who enforces?
The Policy Decision Point evaluates applicable policy and determines whether access should be allowed or denied.
NIST describes the PDP as the access-control component that computes access decisions by evaluating applicable policy.
ACCESS REQUEST
β
βΌ
PDP
Evaluate policy
β
ββββ΄ββββ
ALLOW DENY
The Policy Enforcement Point enforces the authorization decision.
NIST defines the PEP as the component that enforces access-policy decisions for requests to protected resources.
SUBJECT
β
βΌ
PEP
β
βββ Ask PDP
β
βΌ
DECISION
β
βΌ
PEP
β
ALLOW / BLOCK
β
βΌ
RESOURCE
Makes the decision.
Enforces the decision.
A Policy Information Point supplies information needed for policy evaluation.
NIST's Zero Trust implementation glossary describes a PIP as providing telemetry or information that a PDP uses in access decisions.
Examples:
identity system;
device management;
threat intelligence;
geolocation;
HR status;
risk engine.
A Policy Administration Point is commonly used to represent the function through which authorization policies are created and managed.
Think:
Where policy is administered.
POLICY ADMINISTRATION
PAP
β
βΌ
POLICY
β
PIP βββΊ PDP
β
β decision
βΌ
PEP
β
βΌ
RESOURCE
NIST Zero Trust Architecture states that authentication and authorization of both subject and device occur before establishment of a session to an enterprise resource, without implicit trust based merely on network location.
SUBJECT + DEVICE
β
βΌ
POLICY ENFORCEMENT POINT
β
βΌ
POLICY DECISION POINT
β
βββββΌβββββββββββββ
βΌ βΌ βΌ
Identity Device Risk
β Posture Context
ββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
βΌ
ALLOW / DENY
NIST SP 800-207 divides the PDP concept into:
Policy Engine;
Policy Administrator.
Determines whether access should:
be granted;
denied;
revoked.
Establishes or terminates the communication path based on the policy decision.
A user may be authorized to:
access SharePoint
but not:
modify payroll.
Authentication can be shared.
Authorization remains resource specific.
A session may need reevaluation when:
privilege increases;
resource sensitivity changes;
risk changes.
User may:
view account balance
with normal authentication.
But:
wire $100,000
may require stronger verification and authorization.
Authorization may need immediate revocation when:
employment ends;
role changes;
device becomes compromised;
suspicious activity occurs.
DEFINE POLICY
β
βΌ
IMPLEMENT
β
βΌ
TEST
β
βΌ
MONITOR
β
βΌ
REVIEW
β
βΌ
UPDATE / RETIRE
Example:
Rule 1:
Finance may read financial reports.
Rule 2:
Contractors may not read internal financial reports.
User:
Finance contractor.
What happens?
The policy system needs defined conflict-resolution behavior.
Do not assume ambiguous access should automatically become permission.
Prefer:
clearly defined policy and conservative authorization.
Useful authorization logs can include:
subject;
resource;
requested action;
decision;
reason/policy;
timestamp.
Logs support:
investigation;
access review;
compliance;
anomaly detection.
Wrong password.
Correctly authenticated user requests:
an action not permitted.
These are different security events.
An API should not assume:
authenticated token = unlimited API rights.
It should verify authorization for:
requested operation;
requested object.
User can:
GET /users/123
That does not necessarily mean user may:
DELETE /users/123
A user may be authorized to:
view their own account
but not:
another customer's account.
Authorization must sometimes evaluate the specific object, not merely the application function.
Administrative permissions should be:
narrowly scoped;
separately authorized;
monitored;
periodically reviewed.
A user may temporarily elevate privilege for an approved administrative action.
This connects to the next lesson's Domain 5.5 privilege-escalation lifecycle objective.
An organization can combine:
RBAC
+
ABAC
+
RULES
+
RISK
Example:
User must be in the Physician role, assigned to the patient, using a managed device, and not triggering high-risk indicators.
Access maps strongly to job functions.
Central labels and classifications dominate.
Resource owners need discretionary sharing.
Fine-grained contextual decisions are required.
Access should dynamically adapt to current risk.
| Model | Primary Decision Basis | Typical Strength | Main Challenge |
|---|---|---|---|
| RBAC | Role | Manageable business alignment | Role explosion |
| Rule-Based | System rules | Predictable conditional control | Rule complexity |
| MAC | Labels/clearances | Strong centralized control | Rigidity |
| DAC | Owner discretion | Flexible collaboration | Over-sharing |
| ABAC | Attributes + policy | Fine-grained/contextual | Attribute/policy complexity |
| Risk-Based | Current risk/context | Adaptive decisions | Accurate risk signals |
Use PERMIT when answering authorization questions.
Who or what is the subject?
What legitimate business access is required?
Which exact object or service is requested?
Which authorization model applies?
What attributes, rules, risk, or environmental factors matter?
PDP decides; PEP enforces.
P
PRINCIPAL
β
βΌ
E
ENTITLEMENT NEED
β
βΌ
R
RESOURCE
β
βΌ
M
MODEL
β
βΌ
I
INSPECT CONTEXT
β
βΌ
T
TAKE & ENFORCE
DECISION
An organization grants permissions according to job functions such as Teller, Branch Manager, and Auditor.
Which model is being used?
A. RBAC
B. DAC
C. MAC
D. Risk-based only
A
A firewall permits administration only from the management network between 06:00 and 22:00.
Which model BEST describes this decision?
A. Rule-based access control
B. RBAC only
C. DAC
D. Biometrics
A
A user with Secret clearance cannot access a Top Secret document even though the document's creator wants to share it.
Which model is MOST clearly represented?
A. MAC
B. DAC
C. RBAC
D. SSO
A
The owner of a document chooses which coworkers can read or modify it.
Which model is MOST directly represented?
A. DAC
B. MAC
C. RBAC
D. Kerberos
A
A doctor may access a medical record only if the doctor is assigned to the patient, is on duty, and uses a compliant device.
Which model BEST fits?
A. ABAC
B. DAC only
C. MAC only
D. Static password access
A
An authenticated customer initiates an unusually large financial transfer from an unknown device in another country. The system requires additional authentication.
Which approach is BEST represented?
A. Risk-based access control
B. DAC
C. Static RBAC only
D. Physical access
A
Which component should determine whether a request satisfies authorization policy?
A. PDP
B. PEP
C. UPS
D. CDN
A
Which component actually blocks the user's request after policy returns DENY?
A. PEP
B. PDP only
C. Certificate Authority
D. KDC
A
A payment clerk can create and approve the same payment.
What is the PRIMARY problem?
A. Separation-of-duties violation
B. Weak encryption
C. Kerberos failure
D. Network latency
A
A database backup account has Domain Administrator privileges.
What principle has MOST clearly been violated?
A. Least privilege
B. Availability
C. Federation
D. Data retention
A
Security management wants a conceptual representation showing permissions for every subject against multiple resources.
What model is MOST useful?
A. Access-control matrix
B. Network topology
C. Risk heat map
D. Data-flow diagram only
A
An administrator views a file and sees a list identifying which users and groups may read, write, or modify it.
What is being viewed?
A. ACL
B. TGT
C. OAuth scope
D. VLAN table
A
An organization has created 4,000 roles for 2,500 employees because every slight variation in context requires a different role.
What problem is MOST evident?
A. Role explosion
B. Weak encryption
C. Excessive federation
D. Network convergence
A
An ABAC policy grants finance access based on the employee's department attribute. HR incorrectly identifies an employee as Finance.
What is the PRIMARY weakness?
A. Attribute quality/integrity
B. Encryption strength
C. Network routing
D. Fire suppression
A
A user was authorized earlier in the day, but endpoint telemetry now reports malware on the user's device.
What is the BEST action?
A. Reevaluate and potentially revoke access.
B. Maintain access forever because authentication succeeded earlier.
C. Disable monitoring.
D. Trust the device because it is corporate-owned.
A
A user is authorized to read Customer 100's account but changes the URL and accesses Customer 101's record.
What control has MOST clearly failed?
A. Object-level authorization
B. Authentication
C. Encryption
D. Physical access
A
Incorrect.
Authentication establishes identity.
Authorization determines access.
Incorrect.
RBAC:
Roles.
Rule-based:
Rules and conditions.
Not here.
In access-control discussions:
No.
DAC gives meaningful access discretion to the object owner or authorized controller.
No.
A subject may also require:
classification compatibility;
category/compartment authorization;
need to know.
Not necessarily.
Poorly designed roles can contain excessive permissions.
No.
ABAC may evaluate:
subject;
object;
action;
environment.
NIST explicitly describes these categories in its ABAC definition.
No.
ABAC provides greater flexibility but can increase complexity.
Choose according to requirements.
Risk-based access may:
allow;
deny;
restrict;
require step-up authentication.
The PDP makes the policy decision.
The PEP enforces it.
Zero Trust specifically rejects implicit trust based solely on network location.
An ACL is generally an object-oriented implementation view.
The access matrix is a broader conceptual representation.
Not ordinarily.
That would contradict the central purpose of Mandatory Access Control.
SSO supports authentication.
Authorization remains separate.
What does authorization determine?
A. What an authenticated subject may do.
B. Who the subject claims to be.
C. Whether hardware is available.
D. How data is encrypted.
A
Which model assigns permissions according to job responsibilities?
A. RBAC
B. MAC
C. DAC
D. Risk-based only
A
Which model uses predefined system conditions or rules?
A. Rule-based access control
B. RBAC only
C. DAC
D. SSO
A
Which model relies strongly on centrally managed classifications and clearances?
A. MAC
B. DAC
C. SSO
D. OAuth
A
Which model commonly allows the object owner to determine access?
A. DAC
B. MAC
C. RBAC only
D. Kerberos
A
Which model evaluates subject, object, action, and environmental characteristics?
A. ABAC
B. DAC only
C. SAML
D. RADIUS
A
Which model can dynamically use current risk signals?
A. Risk-based access control
B. Static DAC only
C. Physical access only
D. SSO
A
Which component makes the authorization decision?
A. PDP
B. PEP
C. Router only
D. Certificate Authority
A
Which component enforces the authorization decision?
A. PEP
B. PDP
C. PIP only
D. HR system
A
What does a PIP provide?
A. Information needed for policy decisions.
B. Physical power.
C. Encryption keys only.
D. Backups.
A
What is least privilege?
A. Providing only permissions required for authorized duties.
B. Giving all users administrator access.
C. Eliminating authorization.
D. Using shared accounts.
A
What does need to know primarily limit?
A. Information access.
B. Network bandwidth.
C. CPU capacity.
D. Authentication protocols.
A
What is the primary purpose of separation of duties?
A. Prevent one person from controlling an entire sensitive process.
B. Increase password reuse.
C. Remove auditing.
D. Eliminate identity proofing.
A
What is role explosion?
A. Excessive proliferation of narrowly defined roles.
B. Failure of a server.
C. A denial-of-service attack.
D. Password compromise.
A
What is an ACL?
A. List describing access permissions associated with a resource.
B. Kerberos ticket.
C. Encryption key.
D. Routing protocol.
A
Why is attribute integrity important in ABAC?
A. Incorrect attributes can cause incorrect authorization decisions.
B. Attributes determine network speed.
C. Attributes replace authentication entirely.
D. Attributes are always passwords.
A
What should happen if authorization cannot establish that access is permitted?
A. Normally deny access.
B. Automatically grant administrator rights.
C. Ignore policy.
D. Disable logging.
A
Which model is MOST appropriate when access depends heavily on current device posture and location?
A. ABAC/risk-aware authorization
B. DAC alone
C. Static physical key
D. SSO only
A
Which statement is MOST accurate?
A. Real environments can combine RBAC, ABAC, rules, and risk-based decisions.
B. Only one access-control model can ever exist in an organization.
C. Authentication replaces authorization.
D. DAC and MAC are identical.
A
Which is the BEST description of authorization?
A. Policy-based determination of whether a subject may perform an action on a resource.
B. Establishing a username.
C. Encrypting data.
D. Backing up accounts.
A
A company wants employees to receive application permissions automatically according to job function.
Which model is BEST?
A. RBAC
B. DAC
C. MAC
D. Risk-based only
A
A research system requires access decisions based on user clearance, project membership, document classification, and geographic location.
Which model BEST supports this level of contextual authorization?
A. ABAC
B. DAC alone
C. Basic RBAC alone
D. Shared accounts
A
A military information system prevents document owners from sharing classified information with users lacking required clearance.
Which model is MOST appropriate?
A. MAC
B. DAC
C. SSO
D. OAuth
A
A collaboration platform allows document owners to decide which teammates may edit their files.
Which model is MOST clearly represented?
A. DAC
B. MAC
C. Risk-based
D. Kerberos
A
A user in the Payroll Manager role can approve payroll, but a policy prohibits approvals outside the approved payroll window.
Which authorization mechanisms are being combined?
A. RBAC and rule-based access control
B. MAC and DAC only
C. SAML and OAuth
D. Kerberos and LDAP
A
A Zero Trust gateway sends identity, device-health, and threat information to a component that decides whether access should proceed.
Which component is making the decision?
A. PDP
B. PEP
C. Switch only
D. DNS resolver
A
The PDP returns DENY, but a gateway still permits the traffic.
What has failed?
A. Policy enforcement
B. Authentication proofing
C. Identity registration
D. Data classification
A
An organization creates an ABAC policy but allows ordinary users to modify their own department and clearance attributes.
What is the GREATEST concern?
A. Untrusted attributes can undermine authorization decisions.
B. ABAC cannot use departments.
C. Authentication becomes impossible.
D. Network latency will rise.
A
An employee changes from Accounts Payable to Marketing but retains the Accounts Payable role.
Which risk is MOST directly created?
A. Excessive authorization/access creep
B. Weak encryption
C. Failed authentication
D. Packet loss
A
The lifecycle correction will be covered in Lesson Twenty.
An authenticated cloud administrator accesses a highly sensitive resource from a new unmanaged device. Policy allows normal cloud access but requires managed devices for privileged administration.
What should occur?
A. Deny or require remediation/stronger controls for the privileged request.
B. Allow because authentication succeeded.
C. Ignore device condition.
D. Remove all authorization controls.
A
A business owner asks security to allow every employee access to a sensitive repository because it will simplify administration.
What is the BEST security response?
A. Define legitimate business roles and apply least privilege.
B. Grant universal access.
C. Disable auditing.
D. Share a common administrator account.
A
A payment system permits the same person to create, approve, and release payments.
Which authorization design should be improved FIRST?
A. Separation of duties.
B. Password length.
C. Network topology.
D. Backup retention.
A
| Concept | Ask |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Who are you? |
| Authorization | What may you do? |
| Least privilege | What is the minimum permission required? |
| Need to know | Which information is legitimately required? |
| Separation of duties | Should one person control all steps? |
| PDP | Who decides? |
| PEP | Who enforces? |
| PIP | What information informs the decision? |
| Model | Memory Trigger |
|---|---|
| RBAC | Role |
| Rule-based | IF/THEN rule |
| MAC | Mandatory labels |
| DAC | Owner discretion |
| ABAC | Attributes |
| Risk-based | Current risk/context |
| Question | MAC | DAC | RBAC | ABAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main basis | Labels | Owner choice | Role | Attributes |
| Centrally managed | Strongly | Less so | Yes | Policy-driven |
| Flexible collaboration | Lower | High | Moderate | High |
| Context awareness | Limited traditionally | Limited | Limited traditionally | Strong |
| Common exam phrase | Classification | Owner decides | Job function | Subject/object/environment |
PAP
Policy management
β
βΌ
PIP ββββββββΊ PDP
Information Decision
β
βΌ
PEP
Enforcement
β
βΌ
RESOURCE
NIST's current Zero Trust implementation glossary explicitly distinguishes the PDP, PEP, and PIP functions.
Determination of whether a subject is permitted to perform a requested action on a resource.
Active entity requesting access.
Protected resource being accessed.
Authorized operation on a resource.
Authorized capability, often associated with elevated system actions.
Access or permission granted to an identity.
Conceptual representation of subjects, objects, and allowed operations.
Access Control List associated with a resource.
Subject-oriented representation of authority to access resources.
Access is denied unless it has been appropriately authorized.
Granting only permissions necessary for legitimate duties.
Restricting information to individuals with legitimate operational need.
Dividing critical responsibilities among multiple entities.
Role-Based Access Control.
Organizational function associated with permissions.
Inheritance relationship among roles.
Excessive creation of narrowly specialized roles.
Authorization based on defined rules or conditions.
Mandatory Access Control.
Classification and/or category information used by mandatory policy.
Authorization level assigned to a subject.
Discretionary Access Control.
Entity permitted to exercise discretionary control over an object.
Attribute-Based Access Control.
Characteristic of the requesting entity.
Characteristic of the protected resource.
Context such as time, location, device posture, or threat condition.
Authorization dynamically informed by current risk.
Policy Decision Point.
Policy Enforcement Point.
Policy Information Point.
Policy Administration Point.
Component making grant, deny, or revoke decisions in NIST Zero Trust Architecture.
Authorization that changes based on current context or risk.
When you see an authorization question, use:
WHO IS THE SUBJECT?
β
WHAT IS THE RESOURCE?
β
WHAT ACTION IS REQUESTED?
β
WHAT BUSINESS NEED EXISTS?
β
WHICH ACCESS MODEL APPLIES?
β
WHAT CONTEXT MATTERS?
β
WHO DECIDES?
β
WHO ENFORCES?
Remember:
Current CISSP Objective 5.4 explicitly includes RBAC, rule-based, MAC, DAC, ABAC, risk-based access control, and PDP/PEP policy enforcement.
Authentication and authorization are different.
ACLs are generally object oriented.
Access matrices provide a conceptual subject/object representation.
RBAC maps access to organizational roles.
NIST's RBAC work emphasizes permissions being associated with roles and users being assigned to those roles.
Role hierarchies can simplify administration but can also cause privilege accumulation.
Constrained RBAC can enforce separation of duties.
Rule-based and role-based access control are not the same.
MAC relies on mandatory centrally administered policy.
DAC gives resource owners meaningful discretion.
ABAC evaluates attributes associated with subjects, objects, operations, and environment conditions against policy.
ABAC depends heavily on trustworthy attributes.
Risk-based access can adapt according to contextual risk.
The PDP makes the access decision.
The PEP enforces the decision.
PIPs provide information required for decisions.
Zero Trust does not grant implicit trust based on network location or device ownership.
Authorization should be reevaluated when meaningful risk or context changes.
Least privilege applies to every authorization model.
Need to know limits information exposure.
Separation of duties reduces concentration of authority.
Access policies require lifecycle review just like accounts and credentials.
When authorization is unclear, do not assume permission.
Lesson Nineteen moved the IAM discussion from:
Who are you?
to:
What are you allowed to do?
The fundamental authorization relationship is:
SUBJECT
β
βΌ
REQUESTED ACTION
β
βΌ
RESOURCE
β
βΌ
ACCESS POLICY
β
βΌ
ALLOW / DENY
You examined the major access-control models currently identified by ISC2:
RBAC
β
RULE-BASED
β
MAC
β
DAC
β
ABAC
β
RISK-BASED
You learned:
USER
β
ROLE
β
PERMISSIONS
NIST describes RBAC as assigning permissions through organizational roles rather than directly to each individual user.
IF CONDITION
β
THEN DECISION
CLEARANCE
+
LABEL
+
MANDATORY POLICY
OBJECT OWNER
β
GRANTS ACCESS
SUBJECT
+
OBJECT
+
ACTION
+
ENVIRONMENT
+
POLICY
NIST formally defines ABAC around these attribute and policy relationships.
IDENTITY
+
DEVICE
+
BEHAVIOR
+
LOCATION
+
CURRENT RISK
You then examined policy architecture:
PIP
β
βΌ
PDP
β
β DECISION
βΌ
PEP
β
β ENFORCEMENT
βΌ
RESOURCE
NIST's Zero Trust architecture uses this same distinction between access-policy decision and enforcement and does not grant implicit trust merely because a subject is inside an enterprise network.
The central Lesson Nineteen principle is:
Strong authorization grants only the access required for a legitimate purpose, evaluates the correct policy and context, separates the decision from its enforcement where appropriate, continuously limits privilege, and removes authorization when it is no longer justified.
Before continuing, make sure you can explain without reviewing:
Authentication versus authorization.
Subject versus object.
Permission versus privilege.
What an entitlement is.
What an access-control matrix represents.
What an ACL is.
What a capability represents conceptually.
What default deny means.
Explicit versus implicit denial.
Least privilege.
Need to know.
Separation of duties.
What RBAC is.
How user-role assignments work.
How role-permission assignments work.
What role hierarchy means.
What constrained RBAC means.
Static versus dynamic separation of duties.
What role explosion is.
What rule-based access control is.
RBAC versus rule-based access control.
What MAC means.
What security labels are.
Classification versus clearance.
Why need to know still matters in classified environments.
Why ordinary users cannot freely override mandatory policy.
What DAC means.
Why DAC is called discretionary.
MAC versus DAC.
What ABAC means.
Subject attributes.
Object attributes.
Action attributes.
Environmental attributes.
Why attribute integrity matters.
What risk-based access control means.
What adaptive authorization means.
Why authorization may be reevaluated during a session.
What the PDP does.
What the PEP does.
What the PIP does.
What the PAP does conceptually.
The difference between making and enforcing an authorization decision.
How Zero Trust changes authorization assumptions.
Why network location does not automatically create authorization.
Why authorization must be resource specific.
Why API authentication alone does not establish object-level authorization.
Why privileged authorization requires stronger control.
Why access-policy rules must be reviewed over time.
How RBAC, ABAC, rules, and risk-based controls can work together.
Lesson Twenty will focus on CISSP Domain 5.5 β Manage the identity and access provisioning lifecycle.
The current CISSP outline explicitly includes:
account-access reviews for users, systems, and services;
provisioning and deprovisioning;
onboarding;
offboarding;
transfers;
role definition and transition;
privilege escalation;
use of sudo and auditing privileged activity;
service-account management.
Lesson Twenty will cover:
Joiner-Mover-Leaver processes;
identity sources;
authoritative identity data;
onboarding;
account creation;
initial access;
access approval;
birthright access;
request-based access;
role assignment;
group assignment;
entitlement provisioning;
access certification;
access recertification;
periodic reviews;
manager reviews;
data-owner reviews;
segregation-of-duty reviews;
transfers;
role changes;
access creep;
privilege accumulation;
deprovisioning;
termination;
emergency termination;
orphan accounts;
dormant accounts;
privileged identities;
PAM;
password vaulting;
privileged session management;
JIT/JEA concepts;
privilege escalation;
sudo;
administrator accountability;
break-glass accounts;
service accounts;
workload identities;
machine credentials;
secret rotation;
service-account ownership;
SCIM lifecycle automation;
access-review evidence;
original diagrams;
exam traps;
CISSP-style scenarios.
The central Lesson Twenty question will be:
How should identities and their privileges be created, reviewed, modified, elevated, and removed throughout the complete access lifecycle so that users, systems, services, and administrators never retain unnecessary access?
This lesson is independently developed educational material for the SierraTec Secure CISSP Certification Preparation Course.
CISSP is administered by ISC2. SierraTec Secure's course is independent certification-preparation material and should not be represented as official ISC2 training unless separately authorized.
Current examination alignment was verified against the official ISC2 CISSP Certification Exam Outline. Objective 5.4 currently identifies RBAC, rule-based access control, MAC, DAC, ABAC, risk-based access control, and policy decision/enforcement mechanisms.
ABAC concepts were aligned with NIST SP 800-162, which defines ABAC as evaluating subject, object, operation, and potentially environmental attributes against access-control policy.
RBAC concepts were supplemented by NIST's foundational RBAC model and guidance.
PDP, PEP, and Zero Trust authorization concepts were aligned with NIST SP 800-207 and NIST's current Zero Trust implementation glossary.
The SierraTec Secure PERMIT framework, diagrams, comparisons, scenarios, knowledge checks, and practice questions are original instructional content and are not actual, recalled, leaked, or official CISSP examination questions.